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h i g h l i g h t s
• The n-player lottery contest is shown to admit a best-response potential.
• This holds likewise for contest technologies that reflect the possibility of a draw.
• In particular, a non-trivial two-player zero-sum game may admit a best-response potential.
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a b s t r a c t
It is shown that the n-player lottery contest admits a best-response potential (Voorneveld, 2000). This is
true also when the contest technology reflects the possibility of a draw. The result implies, in particular,
the existence of a non-trivial two-player zero-sum game that is best-response equivalent to a game with
identical payoff functions.
© 2017 The Author. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
1. Introduction
Potential games are interesting because they allow conclusions
not only regarding existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium,
but also regarding the outcome of dynamic and boundedly rational
adjustment processes. Since Monderer and Shapley’s (1996) sem-
inal contribution, the literature has produced increasingly flexi-
ble variants of the initial concepts. One such generalization has
led to the notion of a best-response potential (Voorneveld, 2000;
Kukushkin, 2004; Dubey et al., 2006; Uno, 2007, 2011; Park, 2015).
According to the definition, a game with continuous strategy
spaces admits a best-response potential if there is a game with
identical payoff functions that is best-response equivalent (hence-
forth BR-equivalent, etc.) to the original game, i.e., that has the same
BR-correspondence, mapping any profile of pure strategies to a set
of pure strategy profiles, as the original game.
This paper has two parts. In the first, we show that the n-player
lottery contest admits a BR-potential. This holds true regardless
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of whether the contest allocates the prize with probability one
(Haavelmo, 1954; Tullock, 1975; Bell et al., 1975; Baron, 1994) or
there is a probability of a draw (Loury, 1979; Dasgupta and Nti,
1998; Blavatskyy, 2010; Jia, 2012).1 In the second part of the paper,
we exploit the strategic equivalence between contests and zero-
sum games,2 so as to derive potentially interesting implications of
our result. In particular, it is shown that a non-trivial two-player
zero-sum game may be BR-equivalent to a game with identical
payoff functions.
The lottery contest and its natural generalizations have found
widespread application in economics and political theory (Konrad,
2009). It corresponds to a Cournot game with isoelastic inverse
demand and constant marginal costs. Deschamps (1975) proved
convergence of fictitious play in a two-player Cournot oligopoly
1 Like this paper, Dasgupta and Nti (1998) allow for both cases.
2 By strategic equivalence, we mean vNM-equivalence (Morris and Ui, 2004),
i.e., for each player, the payoff function in one game is equal to a positive constant
times the payoff function in the other game, plus a term that depends only on the
opponents’ strategies. The strategic equivalence between contests and zero-sum
games is implicit in Moulin and Vial (1978). Applications include Pavlov (2013),
Ewerhart and Valkanova (2016), and Hwang and Rey-Bellet (2017).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.03.030
0165-1765/© 2017 The Author. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
C. Ewerhart / Economics Letters 155 (2017) 168–171 169
with strictly declining BR-functions. Thorlund-Petersen (1990)
extended this result to an arbitrary number of firms. An exact
potential exists for the Cournot game with linear demand (Slade,
1994). More generally, sufficient conditions for the existence of
a BR-potential have been found for aggregative games that allow
monotone BR-selections (Huang, 2002; Dubey et al., 2006; Jensen,
2010). However, all these methods do not apply to the lottery
contest whose BR-function is not monotone (Dixit, 1987). Also
more recent examples of BR-potential games (Dragone et al., 2012;
Bourlès et al., 2015) do not cover the case of the lottery contest.
2. The lottery contest admits a BR-potential
In the lottery contest Ga, with noise parameter a ≥ 0, common
valuation V > 0, and n ≥ 2 players, each player i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
simultaneously and independently chooses an effort xi ≥ 0, and
subsequently receives a payoff of
uai (x1, . . . , xn) =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
xi
a+ xV − xi if a+ x > 0
V/n if a+ x = 0,
(1)
where x = x1 + · · · + xn denotes aggregate effort. The game Ga is
known to possess a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium that is
necessarily symmetric (Dasgupta and Nti, 1998).3
An n-person game G = (X1, . . . , Xn, u1, . . . , un) with strategy
spaces Xi and payoff functions ui : X ≡ X1 × · · · × Xn → R for
players i = 1, . . . , n is called a BR-potential game (Voorneveld,
2000) if there exists a function P : X → R such that
argmax
xi∈Xi
P(xi, x−i) = argmax
xi∈Xi
ui(xi, x−i) (2)
for any i = 1, . . . , n and any x−i = (x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xn) ∈
X−i ≡ X1 × · · · × Xi−1 × Xi+1 × · · · × Xn.
The following observation has, to the author’s knowledge, not
been documented in the literature.4
Proposition 1. For any a ≥ 0, the n-player lottery contest is a
BR-potential game.
Proof. Consider first the case a > 0.We claim that, in this case,
Pa(x1, . . . , xn) =
⎧⎨⎩ax+∑
j<k
xjxk
⎫⎬⎭ V − 13 (a+ x)3 (3)
is a BR-potential for Ga. Indeed, differentiating (3), we find
∂Pa(xi, x−i)
∂xi
= (a+ x−i)V − (a+ x)2, (4)
where x−i = x1 + · · · + xi−1 + xi+1 + · · · + xn. Moreover,
∂2Pa(xi, x−i)
∂x2i
= (−2) · (a+ x) < 0, (5)
i.e., the problemofmaximizing Pa(., x−i) subject to xi ≥ 0 is strictly
concave. The unique solution x∗i ≡ x∗i (x−i, a) is given by
x∗i =
⎧⎨⎩
√
(a+ x−i)V − a− x−i if x−i ≤ V − a
0 if x−i > V − a.
(6)
3 For a = 0, Dasgupta and Nti (1998) assume a different tie-breaking rule, viz.
u0i (0, . . . , 0) = 0 for i = 1, . . . , n. The BR-correspondence is the same, however.
4 Cf., e.g., Chowdhury and Sheremata (2015) and González-Sánchez and
Hernández-Lerma (2016).
But this is just player i’s best-response function in Ga. Hence,
argmax
xi≥0
Pa(xi, x−i) = argmax
xi≥0
uai (xi, x−i), (7)
as claimed.
Consider next the case a = 0. Denote by π (x) the number of
nonzero entries of the vector x = (x1, . . . , xn). We claim that
P0(x1, . . . , xn) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
⎛⎝∑
j<k
xjxk
⎞⎠ V − 1
3
x3 if π (x1, . . . , xn) ≥ 2
−1
3
xjV 2 if π (x1, . . . , xn) = 1
and xj > 0
−1
3
n− 1
n
V 3 if π (x1, . . . , xn) = 0
(8)
is a BR-potential for G0. To see this, suppose first that x−i has at
least two nonzero entries. Then, certainly π (x1, . . . , xn) ≥ 2, so
that from (8),
P0(x1, . . . , xn) =
⎛⎝∑
j<k
xjxk
⎞⎠ V − 1
3
x3. (9)
Moreover, u0i (., x−i) is differentiable, so that in straightforward
extension of the case a > 0 considered above,
argmax
xi≥0
P0(xi, x−i) = argmax
xi≥0
u0i (xi, x−i). (10)
Suppose next that x−i has precisely one nonzero entry xj > 0. Then,
π (x1, . . . , xn) = 2 if xi > 0, and π (x1, . . . , xn) = 1 if xi = 0. Hence,
using (8) another time,
P0(x1, . . . , xn) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
xixjV − 13 (xi + xj)
3 if xi > 0
−1
3
xjV 2 if xi = 0.
(11)
We have to show that the problem ofmaximizing P0(., x−i) subject
to xi ≥ 0 has the unique solution that is given by player i’s best-
response function in G0, i.e., by x∗i =
√
xjV − xj if xj ≤ V and by
x∗i = 0 if xj > V . From the above, it clearly suffices to verify that the
problem maxxi≥0 P
0(xi, x−i) has an interior solution if and only if
xj < V . But indeed, using (11), one can easily check that for xj > 0,
lim
xi→0
xi>0
P0(xi, x−i) = −13x
3
j > −
1
3
xjV 2 = P0(0, x−i) (12)
if and only if xj < V , as illustrated in Fig. 1.
Finally, suppose that all entries of x−i are zero. Then, again from
(8), P0(xi, x−i) = − 13xiV 2 if xi > 0, but P0(0, x−i) < 0, so that
arg maxxi∈Xi P
0(xi, x−i) = ∅. Similarly, u0i (xi, x−i) = V −xi if xi > 0,
but u0i (0, x−i) = V/n, so that arg maxxi∈Xi u0i (xi, x−i) = ∅. Thus, P0
is indeed a BR-potential for G0. □
3. Discussion
Note that Ga does not allow an exact potential for any a ≥ 0.
Indeed, for i ̸= j,
∂2uai (x)
∂xi∂xj
=
(xi − xj)−
(∑
k̸=i,j
xk
)
− a
(a+ x)3 V (13)
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Fig. 1. Constructing a BR-potential in the case a = 0.
is not symmetric with respect to i and j, as required by Monderer
and Shapley’s (1996) necessary condition. Along similar lines, it can
be seen that the lottery contest is not a weighted potential game
either.
For a ≥ V , the function uai (·, x−i) is strictly declining for any
x−i and i, and therefore, Pa is actually an ordinal potential for Ga.
However, Pa is not even a generalized ordinal potential when a <
V . Indeed, for xi = ε > 0 small enough, x′i = V − a, and x−i = 0,
uai (xi, x−i)− uai (x′i, x−i)
=
(
ε
a+ εV − ε
)
−
(
V − a
a+ (V − a)V − (V − a)
)
> 0, (14)
whereas, from (3) and (8),
Pa(xi, x−i)− Pa(x′i, x−i)
= ε
{
a(V − a− ε)− ε
2
3
}
− (V − a)
3
3
< 0, (15)
in conflict with the definition.5
Park (2015) argued that, if preferences are complete but the
BR-set is empty, the BR-potential should generate the same pref-
erences over strategies as the payoff function. To check this condi-
tion, note that for x−i = 0,
P0(xi, x−i) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
−1
3
xiV 2 if xi > 0
−1
3
n− 1
n
V 3 if xi = 0.
(16)
Thus, P0 induces a preference for lower strategies among positive
strategies xi > 0, and an indifference between xi = 0 and
xi = n−1n V . This is likewise true for preferences reflecting player
i’s payoffs when x−i = 0,
u0i (xi, x−i) =
{V − xi if xi > 0
V/n if xi = 0.
(17)
Thus, P0 satisfies Park’s condition.
Proposition 1 extends to any convex combination between a
purely random allocation and the lottery contest (Haavelmo, 1954;
Baron, 1994). The same is true for Amegashie’s (2006) contestwith
minimum efforts.
5 This leaves, of course, the theoretical possibility that another functionmight be
a (generalized) ordinal potential for Ga when a < V .
4. Implications
This section presents two implications of Proposition 1.
An n-player game G will be called n − 1 multilateral if for any
i = 1, . . . , n, there exist functions hij : X−j → R for j ∈ {1, . . . , n},
such that ui(x) =∑nj=1hij(x−j). Any zero-sum equivalent potential
n-player game is necessarily equivalent to an n − 1 multilateral
game (Brânzei et al., 2003; Hwang and Rey-Bellet, 2017). As the fol-
lowing result shows, this need not be so for a zero-sum equivalent
BR-potential game.
Proposition 2. For any n ≥ 2, there exists a zero-sum equivalent
BR-potential n-player game that is not equivalent to an n − 1 multi-
lateral game.
Proof. Recall that G0 is strategically a zero-sum game.6 To see that
G0 is not n− 1 multilateral, note that
∂n−1uai (xi, x−i)
∂x1...∂xi−1∂xi+1...∂xn
= (−1)n−1(n− 1)! xi
(xi + x−i)n (18)
depends nontrivially on xi, which is impossible for an n− 1 multi-
lateral game. □
Call a two-player game trivial if eachplayer’s BR-correspondence
is constant. For n = 2, the statement of Proposition 2 may be
strengthened as follows.
Corollary 1. There exists a non-trivial two-person zero-sum equiva-
lent BR-potential game.
Hwang and Rey-Bellet (2017) have shown that, for n ≥ 3,
the n-player Cournot game with linear demand, which admits an
exact potential, is zero-sum equivalent. This is not true for n = 2,
however, so that Corollary 1 may indeed be of interest.
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